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THE CLASSICAL AND THE
CONTEMPORARY: NEUROPLASTICITY
AND THE REEMERGENCE OF VIRTUE
Unlike ancient Greece where personal
virtue was the route to fulfillment, mod-
ern man typically seeks to improve human
well-being by external means, in a process
known as the medicalization of society.
The apparent novelty of recent proposals
in psychological theory to develop charac-
ter strength, therefore, lies in their reem-
phasis on a personal implementation of
positive values (Peterson and Seligman,
2004). Among the factors contributing
to a new look at self-determination has
been the capacity for the neural sub-
strate to selectively alter itself via neuro-
plasticity. Indeed, the confluence of past
and contemporary thinking may presage
a consideration of neurobiological instan-
tiation within which virtuous behavior
may be enhanced in accord with principles
governing neuroplastic change.
But what are virtues and positive traits?
And to what extent can these concep-
tions inform our growing understand-
ing of the neural contribution to human
behavior? Presupposed in such questions
is a conceptual ground needed to define a
corresponding empirical terrain (Bennett
and Hacker, 2003), without which such
information would lack coherence and
conclusive power. Accordingly, positive
psychology identifies a positive trait as
a “disposition to act, desire, and feel”
involving the exercise of judgment and
leading to a recognizable human excel-
lence’ (Park et al., 2004). The concise, but
more precise formula of Aquinas, “habi-
tus operativus bonus,” is similarly con-
ceived (Hibbs, 1999). Anglicized, habi-
tus connotes habit, often considered a
compelling behavioral pattern reinforced
through repetitive activity, but in an
Aquinas context also evinces a free-
dom associated with the deployment
of a skill acquired and honed through
repeated engagement. Operativus, under-
stood to mean operationally effective,
connotes stability and continuity, a dis-
position to future performance. The third
term, bonus, grants an orientational norm
more precise than the analogous “rec-
ognizable excellence” and that Aquinas
grounds in right reason and love of
neighbor. Accordingly, we will employ
the construct “habitus operativus bonus”
rather than “positive traits” in the ensuing
discussion.
A priori, habitus tacitly acknowledges
a behavior’s dependence on repetitive
engagement. This acknowledgement has
received much confirmation from empir-
ical studies of patterned behavior; and
many of the physiological, cellular, and
molecular features have now been elu-
cidated. Originally theorized by Hebb
(1949) as an activity dependent synap-
tic strengthening, this interpretation
was subsequently confirmed by Lomo’s
discovery (Lomo, 2003) of the long term
potentiation effect (LTP). In the Hebbian
scheme synaptic strength is enhanced by
coincident, and repetitive, neural activ-
ity. The molecular details of this effect
entail a host of short term, cell signaling
and, when sufficiently stimulated, long
term, transcriptional and cell restructur-
ing mechanisms (Benfenati, 2007). The
former involve an enhancement of Ca
influx at both pre and post synaptic sites,
together with a corresponding activation
of Ca dependent protein kinases, last-
ing minutes to hours. The latter involve
a wholesale restructuring of synaptic
contacts that can potentiate enhanced
synaptic efficiency for days and even
months. A key mechanism in transcrip-
tional up-regulation is the kinasemediated
activation of the CREB set of activator
and repressor proteins. The stabilization,
and proliferation, of coordinated synap-
tic activity, thereby, increasingly routs
information flow through select circuit
pathways.
These observations confirm three con-
clusions that follow from the classic for-
mulation. First, they show that habitual
activity is needed to enhance synaptic
strength. Second, the behavioral perfor-
mance or skill is made more easily opera-
tive. The freedom spoken of by Aquinas is
thus neurally provided for in the enhanced
information flow through the behavioral
circuit. Finally, the ease of flow facilitates
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and so disposes, the circuit to similar
operation in the future.
Yet, what underlies the selection of
one circuit in preference of another? In
the classical formulation stress is laid on
the learned features of virtuous behavior.
In contemporary neuroscience patterned
behaviors presuppose a unique circuitry
also selected through learning. Insight
into the underlying mechanisms of learn-
ing has come from studies of circuits
comprised of small numbers of neurons.
Two of these, habituation and sensiti-
zation, are particularly well understood.
Habituation, described as the progressive
decrease in amplitude or frequency of
an output in response to external stim-
uli, restricts information flow from irrele-
vant stimuli by reducing Ca influx needed
for presynaptic vesicle release (Rankin
et al., 2009). Sensitization reverses this
effect, and thereby emphasizes the impact
of relevant stimuli, through a cAMP
kinase induced increase in Ca. Nor are
these alone. Recent studies of underly-
ing mechanisms of associative learning
reveal that molecular switches, such as
insulin isoforms, for example, can alter
the behavioral pattern in a stimuli depen-
dent manner (Ohno et al., 2014). Such
mechanisms, observed in simple systems,
are likely to constitute unitary learning
modules broadly used for more complex
learning programs. The repertoire of cel-
lular mechanisms, in fact, highlights the
rich potential for the choreography of pat-
terned routines in large scale networks
(Neville et al., 2010). Learned behavior for
what are undoubtedly large scale networks
have now been demonstrated for motor
skill acquisition (Dayan and Cohen, 2012),
clinical therapy (Cramer et al., 2011),
stress related responsivity (Davidson and
McEwen, 2013), and language learning
(Hosoda et al., 2013). Indeed, all behav-
iors for which there is a demonstrable need
for repeated or habitual performance are
likely to be undergirded by such plastic
mechanisms, including the execution of
virtue.
PRUDENCE AND NEUROSCIENCE IN
THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE
The manner of the selection of one cir-
cuit over another, nonetheless, has raised
the question of the valuation of a behav-
ior that may lead to its selection. It is
in this context that the orientational con-
struct of Aquinas, bonus, is pertinent. In
what manner, then, does the granting of
normative weight to virtue bear on neu-
ral function? Complicating the issue of
value is the matter of valence, defined as
compelling loci within the focal space that
provoke sustained interest for attainment.
Humans, as do all species, possess appeti-
tive desires distributed over a broad range
of physiological and cognitive demands
(Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008). Given
that their salience can vary over a partic-
ularly broad range, it is clear that indi-
vidual variation can become extraordinar-
ily diverse. To accommodate a full spec-
trum of valences, therefore they must
be ordered hierarchically. How so? This
is done in two ways. First, neuroplas-
tic mechanisms may be understood as an
innate capacity to prioritize values dis-
positionally through circuit reiterations.
Secondly, they may be invoked experien-
tially or intentionally through higher order
processes. Experience dependent learning
of motor skills in the cerebellum, and
conditioning dependent learning in the
hippocampus, for example, both imple-
ment other cortical centers, that progres-
sively shift in a learning dependentmanner
(Melia et al., 1996; Doyon et al., 2002).
The very diversity of valences, how-
ever, and the relative intensities to which
salience is attributed, generate transforma-
tions as numerous in kind as the individu-
als in whom they are effected. Accordingly,
it is to other dimensions that recourse
must be made to order what will ulti-
mately become dispositional preferences.
In a Thomistic scheme value is estab-
lished rationally, according to the dictates
of practical reason, i.e., prudentia, and
by conformity to an ordering principle,
i.e.,“beatitude.” The inclination to future
performance, though, and the assessment
of deviation from preferred behavior may
be matters heavily influenced by neu-
ral architecture. There is, for example,
a notable correspondence between habit-
ual behavior, the computational proper-
ties of corrective learning algorithms, and
the physiology/anatomy of the dopamin-
ergic system, a correspondence that also
appears to extend to goal directed behavior
(Daw and Shohamy, 2008). Nonetheless,
some values may be innate (Bloom, 2010),
and others acquired (Stanley, 2008) with
little or no conscious reflection. Babies,
who lack a power for speech, but who can
still indicate intentions through eye move-
ment, are able to discriminate between
various actions as to their moral worth.
They know, for example, when an action
is unjust, or altruistic. This has been inter-
preted to indicate a native capacity for
goodness in its “infancy.” Preconscious,
implicitly acquired value, such as those
studied with the implicit association test
(IAT, 2014), likewise show that not all
value is determined rationally.
Still, Aquinas’ insistence on ratio-
nal deliberation as the necessary, con-
scious precursor to normative assignments
intrinsic to virtuous behavior, is receiv-
ing renewed neuroscientific interest. In
value assignment studies of children, nor-
mative values were not conditioned by
background attitudes, but rather by a
structured rationale from which moral
inferences were then drawn (Hussar and
Harris, 2010). Moreover, the reflective
process of deliberation is a manifestly
and universal social tool (Bloom, 2010).
Embedded in the recognition of such
deliberation is the notion of its procedural
development, according to logical infer-
ence and structured on grounding princi-
ples. Nevertheless, the practical reasoning
spoken of by Aquinas, and by which pru-
dence must be exercised, is very much in
its infancy from the vantage of a neuro-
scientific understanding. Language, men-
tal representations, syllogistic reasoning,
insight, and relative judgments (Dadosky,
2014; Hauser et al., 2014) have stimulated
theoretical discussion, but the empirical
dimensions for which these concepts may
antecede are at best correlative.
Perhaps most elusive is the man-
ner in which the neural structure may
be contributory to a state phenomeno-
logically described by the orientational
construct, bonus, the ordering princi-
ple by which normative assignments are
inferred through rational and delibera-
tive discourse. For Aquinas this first prin-
ciple is self evident and non-deducible.
Like habitus, this concept is also mul-
titoned, expressing both the means that
may be used, i.e., morality, as well as
the goal, flourishing, or beatitude, that
is to be attained. Such conceptions have
been differentially interpreted neurosci-
entifically with most focus given to the
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practical means. A large body of work
has now been devoted to how a moral
understanding may have originated, usu-
ally couched in terms of its evolution-
ary, social development (Hauser, 2014).
Rudimentary notions of altruistic behav-
ior have been observed in some species
(Zwick and Fletcher, 2014) and mirror
neurons, which have been inferred to grant
a capacity for empathic associations, stud-
ied (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Still
the notion of beatitudo of Aquinas with
its connotations of meaning, fulfillment,
and openness to infinite and transcen-
dental being does not appear capable of
resolution at anything less than an integra-
tionist account of the whole neural plat-
form. Some suggestion of this appears in
discussions of the neural underpinnings
of the self and of downwardly causative
operations for which the entire platform is
likely to be necessitated or mobilized for
(Sanguineti, 2013), but for the most part
is undefined. Its relevance for a large part
of humanity, though, is undeniable, pro-
pelling ongoing investigation. Prudentia
thus has many aspects, and enters into
every other virtue (Aquinas, 2011), the
“form” shaping each virtue.
So how are we to view the utility of
“habitus operativus bonus,” and the reg-
ulatory virtue of prudence in terms of
conceptual schema for neuroscience? Born
in a prebiological era Aquinas knew lit-
tle of the functional elements of brain
operation; yet he possessed an extraordi-
nary analytical mind and a first person
access to its events. Following a tradi-
tion traced to Aristotelian roots, Aquinas
placed reason and will as the progenitors
of behavior. Not so passion, Aquinas des-
ignation of emotion, despite his extensive
and discrete analysis of the human emo-
tional spectrum (Butera, 2010). Aquinas’
observations, therefore, limited necessar-
ily to those of whole systems, cannot be
a guide to particular empirical events that
underlie systems operations. Nevertheless,
he recognized that such events are contrib-
utory, and in some cases determinative of
their operation. It would have been no sur-
prise that the virtue for which so much
broad scale rational determination must
be exercised would require so many sub-
ordinate neural circuits for its operation.
And it would have been no surprise that to
perfect its operation such circuits must be
repeatedly deployed during learning, and
in the process “disposed” and materially
structured.
In his unified view of nature Aquinas
offers landmarks circumscribing lower
level events, the broad outlines of which
serve in clarifying what the details must
conform to, but not in identifying the
materials by which the paths to these land-
marks are structured. His integrationist
accounts and objective philosophy of the
purpose of brain operation, though, lay
down a route of exploration likely to
be increasingly relevant as neuroscience
explores the global neural platform.
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